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Abstract 
 
The old, understudied electoral system composed of multi-member districts, open ballot 
and plurality rule is presented as the most remote scene of the origin of both political 
parties and new electoral systems.  A survey of the uses of this set of electoral rules in 
different parts of the world during remote and recent periods shows its wide spread.  A 
model of voting by this electoral system demonstrates that, while it can produce varied 
and pluralistic representation, it also provides incentives to form factional or partisan 
candidacies.  Famous negative reactions to the emergence of factions and political 
parties during the 18th and 19th centuries are reinterpreted in this context.  Many 
electoral rules and procedures invented since the second half of the 19th century, 
including the Australian ballot, single-member districts, limited and cumulative ballots, 
and proportiona l representation rules, derived from the search to reduce the effects of 
the ‘originating’ multi-member district system in favor of a single party sweep.  The 
general relations between political parties and electoral systems are restated to account 
for the foundational stage here discussed. 
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Introduction 
 
Political parties and electoral systems have been analyzed both as a cause and as a 
consequence of each other.  First, a long tradition of empirical studies has focused on 
the consequences of electoral systems on party systems.  Maurice Duverger postulates 
that “old” political parties were created internally in elected (and also in non-elected) 
assemblies and parliamentary groups (Duverger 1951; see also LaPalombara and 
Weiner 1966).  In a social choice perspective, the origin of political parties is also found 
in an endogenous process in elected legislatures embodying incentives to form enduring 
voting coalitions (Schwartz 1989, Aldrich 1995).  Empirical analyses of the numbers of 
political parties and their relations, typically focusing on democratic regimes during the 
second half of the 20th century, usually assume that political parties derive from 
elections and electoral systems that are given and can be taken as the independent 
variable in the explanatory framework. (Duverger 1951, Rae 1967, Lijphart 1994).   
An alternative approach has upside down this relationship by postulating that it 
is the parties that choose electoral systems and manipulate the rules of elections.  
According to this approach, the origin of the invention and adoption of different 
electoral rules and procedures, especially during the 19th and early 20th centuries, 
should be found in the incentives created by political party competition.  In this 
approach it is assumed, thus, that it is the political parties that can be taken as given and 
work as the independent variable to explain the emergence of different electoral rules. 
(Grumm 1958, Boix 1999, Colomer 2004a, 2005). 
 The present paper tries to disentangle this discussion by specifying the type of 
assembly and electoral conditions that can be placed in the most remote origins of the 
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creation of political parties.  Specifically, I emphasize the role of traditional elections in 
multi-member districts, with open ballot and plurality rule, in the initial creation of 
political parties.  This understudied, ‘originating’ electoral system was used very widely 
in local and national assemblies in pre-democratic or early democratic periods before 
and during the 19th century; it is still probably the most common procedure in small 
community, condominium, school, university, and union assemblies and elections; and 
it has also been adopted in a few new democracies in recent times.  This set of electoral 
rules appears indeed as almost ‘natural’ and ‘spontaneous’ to many communities when 
they have to choose a procedure of collective decision-making based on votes, 
especially because it permits a varied representation of the community.  
The important point to be remarked here is that these traditional electoral rules, 
while being able to produce fair representation, they also create strong incentives for the 
formation of ‘factional’ candidacies or voting coalitions, in another word ‘parties’.  
Under the ‘originating’ electoral system, factions or parties tend to induce ‘voting in 
bloc’ for a list of candidates, which may change election results radically.  On some 
crucial cases, it was mostly as a consequence of this type of experience that different 
political leaders, candidates and parties began to seek for alternative, less intuitive or 
‘spontaneous’ electoral rules able to produce less advantage for the faction or party best 
organized.  This opened the way in more recent times for parties and politically 
motivated scholars to invent and choose new electoral systems.   
 The structure of the paper is the following.  First, the ‘originating’ electoral 
system based on multi-member districts, open ballot and plurality rule is defined and 
discussed.  Second, a survey of the uses of this set of electoral rules and some of its 
variants in political elections in different parts of the world during remote and recent 
periods shows its wide spread.  Third, a simple model of voting under this type of 
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electoral system demonstrates the incentives to form factional or partisan candidacies.  
Fourth, a number of prominent, mostly negative reactions to the emergence of political 
parties during the 18th and 19th centuries are collected and reinterpreted in the light of 
this discussion.  Fifth, a great variety of electoral rules and procedures invented since 
the second half of the 19th century is presented as directly derived from the ‘originating’ 
system in the intention to reduce its effects in favor of a single party.  In the conclusion, 
the general relations between political parties and electoral systems are restated to 
account for the foundational stage here discussed. 
 
 
1. The ‘originating’ electoral system 
 
The originating electoral system here analyzed has been widely used, especially in 
relatively simple elections with rather homogeneous electorates, particularly at the 
beginning of modern suffrage regulations and for small-size local governments.  
Specifically, with some variants, it was used from the 13th century on in English town 
meetings and shire (county) courts (Bishop 1893), German and Swiss communes and 
cantons (Lloyd 1907), Italian communes (Brucker 1983, Guidi 1992, Hyde 1973, Waley 
1988), French municipalities, and from the 15th century on, also in provincial Estates 
and the Estates-General (Babeau 1882, 1894, Baker 1987, Cadart 1952).  During the 
17th and 18th centuries it was also adopted in the British colonies in North America 
(Sydnor 1962, Pole 1971), as well as, by early 19th century, in Juntas and Cortes 
elections in Spain and in the Spanish and Portuguese colonies in the Americas (Annino 
1995, Graham 1990).   
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This is basically the same type of electoral system that is typically used in many 
meetings and assemblies of modern hous ing condominiums, neighborhood associations, 
school and university boards and delegates, professional organizations, corporation 
boards, and students’ and workers’ unions.  In these as well as in many of the traditional 
communities mentioned in the previous paragraph, individual representation was well 
suited to contexts of high economic and ethnic homogeneity in which it was relatively 
easy to identify common interests and priority public goods to be provided by the elect.  
As will be detailed in the next section, the ‘originating’ system rules have also been 
widely used in larger-scale national and local political elections with limited suffrage 
rights or in new democratic experiments in more recent times. 
 
 The essential elements of this electoral system are the following: 
*  Multi-member districts (M > 1). 
*  Open ballot (V < M). 
*  Plurality or majority rule. 
Where: 
M: District magnitude or number of seats to be filled;  
V: Number of votes per voter. 
 
The first element, multi-member districts, has been understudied in the recent 
political science literature on elections.  Well established empirical ‘tendencies’ in the 
relation between electoral systems and party systems consider two basic types of 
electoral systems: one combining single-member districts with majoritarian rules (which 
are associated to bipartism) and another combining multi-member districts with 
proportional representation rules (corresponding to multipartism).  In contrast, the 
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combination of multi-member districts with majoritarian rules has attracted much less 
attention.  Indeed this type of electoral system would be difficult to fit into the 
mentioned relationships since it permits an individual candidate-based, highly 
pluralistic representation which is characteristic of none of the other two types of 
electoral system mentioned (respectively associated to individual representation and to 
pluralistic representation, but not the two together).  Variants of multi-member district 
elections include both direct voting (like in the old German communes and the English 
and North-American local assemblies) and indirect elections of delegates in several 
stages (more traditional in France, Italy, Spain and Latin America in remote periods).   
The second element, open ballot, permits voters to choose individual candidates, 
not a partisan list.  This is compatible with voting by both raising hands (like in 
traditional Swiss communes or English counties) and oral vote (like in colonial 
Virginia, for instance), even if this requires voting separately for a candidate for each 
seat.  Voting separately for individual candidates by raising hands or by oral vote, as 
well as the request of a second or further rounds for each seat, are procedures favoring 
this type of elections to be hold in an assembly of voters, where successive voting 
rounds can be held comfortably.  An assembly of voters can also proceed with secret 
ballot (including early forms like typical English poll-books with the names of the 
candidates over and against which were set down the votes, or written ballots, already 
used in some North-American colonies since the 17th century).  Distributing groups of 
voters among different booths within the same multi-member district, which may 
facilitate secret ballot, is also compatible with this type of system (as in most at- large 
local or state elections in the United States).  Thus, all these alternative formulas –oral 
or written ballot, assembly or booth voting, second or further round rules— are 
compatible with the essentials of the electoral system here to be discussed.   
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An interesting variant refers to the number of candidates each voter can vote for.  
While in some cases the voter must vote for as many candidates as seats to be filled (V 
= M), an alternative common rule permits the voter to vote for up to as many candidates 
as seats (V < M), which is a limited form of approval voting (already used, for instance, 
in medieval England boroughs and in Italian communes, see Lines 1980).  Voting for 
fewer candidates than seats has been called ‘plumper’, ‘partial abstention’ and other 
names, but ‘limited approval’ voting seems more in tune with well-established precise 
definitions and categories in modern electoral studies. 
[Note: In contrast, standard approval voting permits to vote for up to all candidates but 
one, as presented in Brams and Fishburn 1978, 1983, Weber 1995, Colomer and 
McLean 1998.  Interestingly, while an abundant literature exists on approval voting for 
single-winner elections, apparently nobody has studied approval voting for multi-
winner elections, a variety much more widely used, as demonstrated in the present 
article].   
Other variants may imply a series of successive, ‘staggered’ single-seat elections 
or, as mentioned, may require voters in a multi-seat election to choose one candidate fo r 
each seat, typically among the corresponding subset of candidates previously allocated 
to each seat (a procedure sometimes called ‘place’ system in certain state and local 
elections in the United States).  In spite of certain contrary interpretations, none of these 
procedures is equivalent to a series or a collection of single-member district elections.  
While in single-member district elections the voter elect only one seat, in the variants of 
multi-member district elections now considered each voter still elects multiple seats.   
In staggered successive elections for a single seat each, voters can choose their 
preferred candidates, if they run again and again, in the same way as they can do it in a 
multi-member ballot.  Remember that the system here identified implies no closed party 
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lists of candidates, but individual-candidate votes.  Even if parties present candidacies, 
the voters can choose candidates from different parties at successive single-seat 
elections in a similar way as they can do it in a multi-seat election with no party lists.  A 
prominent example in present times is the United States Senate, in which two-member 
districts with staggered single-seat elections permit the election of senators from two 
different parties in each district, as happens with high and increasing frequency (Brunell 
and Grofman 1998).  In ‘place’ systems forcing the voters to choose for each seat from 
a different subset of candidates, the margin of choice may be more limited.  But if the 
voters’ preferred candidates they would vote for in a multi-seat election are running for 
different seats, they can choose them as well.  In any case, the voter can vote for 
candidates from different parties for different seats. (See discussion with alternative 
interpretations in Cox 1984, Richardson and Cooper 2003). 
Regarding the third element, plurality rule is most common in this type of 
system, but absolute majority rule can also be used.  Variants of the latter include a 
second or a third round by simple plurality or between the two or the three most voted 
candidates at the previous round (like in Ancient regime France).  For several-round 
rules, the procedure may require the voter to vote separately for one candidate for each 
seat, but this may not alter substantially the expected consequences of the election on 
the variety of elected representatives, as discussed above.   
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2. Very wide-spread electoral rules 
 
In the following paragraphs I present a broad although surely incomplete survey of 
modern and current uses of the ‘originating’ electoral system in national and local 
political elections.  The survey starts in Europe, including England, France, Spain and 
other countries, then it goes to the United States and Latin America, and it ends with a 
few notes on Russia and a few Asian and African countries.  
  
England 
Two-member districts were largely used in English shires, towns and boroughs from the 
13th century on.  Still in 1867 three fourths of the English districts for the House of 
Commons elected two members, while the rest were either single- or four-member 
districts.  The proportion of multi-member districts was dramatically reduced to less 
than 10 percent in 1885, but some survived still until 1949.  In two-member districts the 
voter could use either two votes or only one.  According to historians, during the period 
1688-1866 borough elections were dominated by a desire to secure effective 
representation of the public or corporate interest, while there is contemporary evidence 
of a considerable degree of hostility towards parties and partisanship.  The presence of 
political ‘tendencies’ was elusive and partial and included many labels –Radical, Whig, 
Liberal, Tory, Conservative, Peelite, Protectionist—rather than a few compact parties. 
(Mitchell 1976, O’Gorman 1989, Phillips 1992, Plumb 1969, Taylor 1997). 
Multi-member districts and to some extent nonpartisan candidacies have 
survived in English local elections.  According to the rules enforced from 2003 on, still 
about 60 percent of local councils are elected in two- or three-member electoral 
districts, usually called wards or divisions.  They include 36 metropolitan councils in 
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Manchester, Merseyside, South and West Yorkshire, Tyne and Wear, West Midlands, 
as well as the London boroughs, a number of unitary, borough, district and parish/town 
councils, as well as a recently increasing number of urban areas in county councils.  A 
few districts use mixed systems of single- and multi-member constituencies.  Nowadays 
nation-wide political parties dominate local politics, but in 2000 still about 12 percent of 
elected local councilors were independent. (Electoral Commission 2004). 
 
France 
In France, the tradition of using multi-member districts in indirect elections for 
medieval Estates was maintained for post-revolutionary national assemblies during most 
of the 19th century.  From 1789 to 1819, canton or arrondissement assemblies elected 
delegates to department assemblies, which in turn chose deputies.  At least at the 
highest level, majority rule was established with three rounds of voting.  Direct 
elections were introduced since 1848.  Until 1873 and again in 1885, voters still met in 
departmental assemblies and used limited approval voting in a written ballot.  Party lists 
were increasingly relevant, but individual-candidate voting was always feasible. 
(Campbell 1965, Cole and Campbell 1989). 
 The ‘originating’ system has survived in French small municipalities with less 
than 3,500 inhabitants, where the local councils are elected in a single multi-member 
municipal district with individual-candidate voting and majority runoff rule.  For 
recently established regional councils, one fourth of councilors are also elected in a 
single regional district by majority runoff rule, but now using closed lists that produce a 
single-party overrepresentation.  (Dupoirier 2001, Patriat 2001). 
 
Spain 
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Also in Spain multi-member districts were used for indirect elections to anti-French-
invasion Juntas in 1810 and for constitutional elections from 1812 to 1834.  Parish- or 
judicial party-juntas chose electors, which in turn chose deputies (or, in the earliest 
regulations, groups of candidates further selected by lots).  Voting was usually separate 
for each seat by majority runoff.  Direct elections were held since 1837.  In several 
elections until 1865, voters still met at district juntas to elect deputies by limited 
approval voting in a written ballot and majority rule.  Mixed systems of single- and 
multi-member districts, the latter with limited approval voting, were used from 1878 to 
1936.  Since 1977, multi-member districts with individual-candidate ballot are used for 
the Spanish Senate, as well as in local elections for small municipalities with less than 
250 inhabitants. (Rueda 1998, Colomer 2004b). 
 
Rest of Europe 
In the rest of Europe, experiences of nation-wide political elections in multi-member 
districts with majoritarian rules include the following.  Indirect elections with this type 
of electoral system were held in Norway, with an average magnitude of three seats, 
from 1815 to 1903; in Portugal during most of the 19th century; in Sweden from 1866 to 
1908, in all these cases with plurality rule; as well as in Switzerland from 1848 to 1917 
with majority runoff rules.   Direct elections to the national lower chamber with this 
type of electoral system were held in Belgium, with very high district magnitudes up to 
37 seats and majority runoff rule, from 1831 to 1898; in Greece, with either majority or 
plurality rules, from 1844 to 1923, as well as on two isolated occasions as late as 1933 
and 1952; Netherlands used two-member districts and majority runoff rule during all the 
second half of the 19th century. (Carstairs 1980; see collections of historical data in 
Colomer 2004a). 
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While local elections in most European countries are currently held by 
proportional representation rules, still a few use the ‘originating’ electoral system.  In 
Belgium, municipal elections are held in multi-member districts, although voters can 
choose individual candidates only from within a party list.  In Hungary, towns and 
villages with less than 10,000 inhabitants use a single municipal multi-member district, 
limited approval vote and plurality rule.  Individual candidates not officially linked to a 
party are more successful in these districts than in mixed or proportional representation 
systems used in larger municipalities and counties (Benoit 2001).  In Norway, multi-
member local districts use individual-candidate ballots, although three-fourths of the 
chosen candidates must be from the same party list.  In Switzerland, multi-member 
districts are used in seven cantons for the election of either the cantonal assembly or the 
cantonal government or both. (Council of Europe 1999). 
 
United States 
The English model of multi-member districts, individual vote and plurality rule was 
adopted in all the British colonies in North America for the lower houses of their 
legislatures.  Since its inception in 1619, the House of Burgesses in Virginia used 
English-style two-member districts, later enlarged to up to eight seats.  All the other 
colonies also used, for their assemblies, two-, three-, four- or six-member districts, 
while South Carolina and New Jersey had districts with up to 10 and 20 members 
respectively.  Government by town meeting was typical in New England, while parish 
and county districts were more usual in the South.  From the 1720s on, the lower houses 
consolidated their position in the colonial governments and acquired greater autonomy.  
According to historians, a vast majority of legislators, who were elected on individual 
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bases, exhibited habits of consensus not dissimilar to those of the independent members 
of the British parliament. (Dinkin 1993, Greene 1993). 
With independence, state congresses were made larger than the colonial 
assemblies.  Eight new state constitutions established congressional elections in multi-
member districts, while five adopted this formula for most of the districts but also 
introduced a few single-member districts.  The U.S. Presidential College was elected 
mostly in state-wide districts since 1828.  The House of Representatives was also 
initially elected mostly in either state-wide ‘at- large’ districts or in smaller multi-
member districts.  From 1824 on state- level political parties began to emerge.  They 
promoted voting ‘in bloc’ for a list of party candidates or the ‘general ticket’, which 
tended to create state single-party representation.  In defensive reaction, the Whigs 
achieved to approve single-member districts as the general norm for electing the House 
across all the United States territory since 1842.  But at least 16 states still used at- large 
districts during some periods between the 1840s and the 1960s.  (Calabrese 2000, 
Engstrom 2004, Flores 2000, Klain 1955, Wood 1969). 
At state and local levels, most representatives have been elected in multi-
member districts most of the time.  At state level the peak was reached in 1962, when 
41 of the 50 states elected more than half of total state legislators in the country in 
multi-member districts.  In 2000, 15 state lower chambers and four state senates employ 
some multi-member districts, encompassing in total over 25 percent of all state 
legislators (Jewell and Morehouse 2001).   
At municipal level, the progressive-oriented National Municipal League 
recommended in 1899 the adoption of at-large districts to insulate local elections from 
the influence of state and national party politics, a recommendation largely followed, 
together with a non-partisan ballot, especially in the West and the South.  In 1970, over 
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60 percent of the cities and over 30 percent of the counties elected their representatives 
in a single ‘at-large’ district (Cox 1984, Niemi, Hill and Grofman 1985).  In the 1980s, 
at-large districts were used in 84 percent of the largest central cities (Engstrom and 
McDonald 1986, Weaver 1984).  It has been estimated that in about two-thirds of U.S. 
municipal elections, candidates run for office without party label (Cassel 1986).   
The capability of at- large districts to produce a single-party “sweep” in the 
disadvantage of political, ethnic and gender minorities has been broadly discussed.  
Against traditional assumptions, it has been found that, at state level, multi-member 
district lower chambers provide representation more proportional to the ethnic minority 
population than either single-member districts lower chambers or single-member district 
upper chambers in their own states.  Multi-member districts have also favored female 
representation during some periods. (Adams 1996, Niemi, Hill and Grofman 1985, 
Grofman, Migalski and Noviello 1986, Richardson and Cooper 2003). 
 
Latin America 
The election of Juntas and new Spanish Cortes in 1810-1812, above mentioned, was 
extended to the Spanish colonies in North and South America with the same type of 
traditional electoral rules as in the metropolis.  In particular, in New Spain (today’s 
Mexico), for the election of representatives to both the Spanish Cortes and provincial 
councils, multi-member districts were defined as corresponding to traditional parishes 
and the preserved Indian republics.  Similar experiences took place in Argentina in 1811 
and, at the Portuguese Crown’s call, in Brazil in 1821.  After independence, multi-
member districts for the election of the lower chamber of the new congresses were 
widely, generally by plurality rule.  Cases inc lude Argentina, with two- to 20-member 
districts in 1826 and again during the period 1853-1908; Brazil, with districts up to 20 
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and 37 seats from 1824 on, from 1860 on, and in 1890; Chile from 1833 on; Colombia 
from 1857 on; Costa Rica with a mixed system of two-member districts by plurality and 
others by proportional representation during the period 1913-1948; and Honduras with 
an average of tree-member districts during the period 1879-1954. (Colomer 2004c). 
 
Russia 
The first democratic election in Russia, in February 1917, was held according to the 
traditional system above referred to, in districts with magnitudes from one to 15 seats, 
approval vote, and majority rule with third-round plurality.  During the Soviet era, the 
same type of elections in multi-member districts was held, but with the dictatorial rule 
of accepting only one candidate per office.   In post-soviet Russia, starting in 1993, at 
least 24 regional democratic assemblies hold elections with multi-member districts, 
approval vote and plurality rule (in front to 114 regions with mostly single-member 
districts).  In the majority of regions, electoral competition is dominated by independent 
individual candidates.  But, according to the argument above mentioned which will be 
developed in the next section, it has been found that multi-member districts create 
incentives for the formation of coalition and political party candidacies more than 
single-member districts (Golosov 2003). 
 
Asia and Africa 
Both the colonial British legacy and the United States influence contributed to the 
adoption of multi-member district elections by plurality rule in a number of countries in 
Asia and the Pacific.  New Zealand maintained a few tree-member districts during the 
period 1890-1905; the Philippines used also some multi-member districts in 1935 and 
1949; in India about 90 districts (out of 400) elected two or three representatives each 
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from 1950 to 1957; in Thailand a number of multi-member districts are also used since 
1978.  Probably under French influence, also Lebanon used multi-member districts, 
together with majority runoff rule, during the period 1943-1951, and again, with 
plurality rule, since 1953.  Turkey used approval voting, in large districts with up to 27 
seats, during the period 1946-1957. (Hicken and Kasuya 2003, Hicken 2004). 
 A few countries in Africa have also adopted electoral rules including multi-
member districts and majoritarian rules.  They include a few recent democracies: Mali 
and Senegal, both since 1992. (Mozaffar and Vengroff 2002, Mozaffar 2004). 
  
 
3. Endogenous party formation 
 
The ‘originating’ electoral system above reviewed is able to produce a varied individual 
representation of the community.  But at the same time it creates incentives for the 
coordination of candidacies and voting.  Forming or joining a coordinated candidacy, 
usually called ‘faction’ or ‘party’, may increase the prospects of winning additional 
votes and seats.  ‘Party’ is, thus, here defined in a minimalist way that is not 
substantially different from traditional meanings of ‘faction’ in early periods of voting 
and elections.  The distinction between faction and party can make more sense only in a 
further process of organization and development of policy programs and ideology. 
 
----------------    Table 1 about here 
 
 Let us present a simple model in which an election is hold by a two-member 
district, individual-candidate voting, and simple plurality rule.  Let us assume that there 
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are four groups of voters, A, B, C and D, with different preferences over four 
candidates, W, X, Y and Z, as in Table 1.  In Table 1.1, the distribution of voters’ 
preferences is relatively consensual because the ‘intermediate’ groups, B and C, 
encompass 70 out of 90 voters, but in Table 1.2 the distribution is more polarized 
because it is the ‘extreme’ groups, A and D, that now encompass 70 voters (90 is taken 
in the example as the total number of voters to facilitate a majority of 50 without ties).  
If all voters vote for two candidates according to their first and second preferences, the 
total number of votes received by each candidate makes the intermediate candidates X 
and Y the winners, as presented in Column 2.  Observe that, although with different 
numbers of votes, this result is valid for the two distributions of voters, the consensua l 
and the polarized ones.  Every group of voters elects at least one of the candidates it has 
voted for; specifically, the voters of the ‘intermediate’ groups elect the two candidates 
they have voted for while the members of the ‘extreme’ groups elect their second most 
preferred candidate.  Thus, none of the voters’ groups is a total loser. 
 In the third column it is assumed, alternatively, that a ‘party’ is formed by 
candidates W and X.  Let us assume that all voters vote now for all the candidates of the 
party including their first preference, that is, all voters preferring either W or X as the 
first preference vote now ‘in bloc’ for W and X, even if some of them would have 
preferred another candidate as second preference (Y in the example).  The result is that 
now W and X become the winners –the party ‘sweep’. Only three groups of voters elect 
now some candidate they have voted for; specifically, the members of the ‘extreme’ 
group A elect all the candidates they have voted for, the members of the ‘intermediate’ 
group B elect only their first preference, and the members of the other ‘intermediate’ 
group C elect only their second preference; in contrast, the members of group D do not 
elect now any of the candidates they have voted for.   
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It is important to remark that, in order to attain a party-sweep, it is not necessary 
that all voters –like in the model— or even most or many of them follow the advice of 
factional leaders to vote for all and only for the members of a list of candidates.  It may 
be sufficient that a few people do it, since, even if they are few, they can make a 
difference, especially under simple plurality rule not requiring any specific threshold of 
votes to win.   
The party sweep result might be more satisfactory than the previous individual-
candidate result for some voters in a polarized distribution (depending on how voters 
evaluate their relative satisfaction with their first and second preferences), but it is 
exclusionary for those members of the electorate who become total losers.  Certainly, 
the party-sweep result is less collective satisfactory than the individual-candidate result 
in the consensual distribution, which, as noted above, is more typical of small local, 
early national, and professional communities having traditionally used this electoral 
system. 
  A logical reaction to the party sweep can be the formation of another ‘party’, say 
in this example with Y and Z, also able to make the voters voting in bloc for all the 
candidates of the party if they include their first preference.  The fourth column in the 
Table shows the results of a two-party election.  In this example, the winners are still W 
and X, but the losers are now closer to the winners in numbers of votes, which may 
make them persevere in their party candidacy in furthe r elections in the expectation to 
turn over a few more votes and win in bloc.  Similar results can be obtained if we 
assume somewhat different distributions of voters’ preferences, voting by majority 
runoff rule, or other variations the reader may be interested to explore. 
 This stylized model may account for the endogenous formation of parties, 
initially conceived only as enduring candidacy and voting coalitions, in early elections 
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and assemblies using the ‘originating’ electoral system.  The model also suggests that 
the emergence of parties may produce sentiments of dissatisfaction and disappointment 
in comparison with previous experiences of voting for individual candidates, especially 
in largely consensual societies in which the formation of party candidacies may 
introduce political polarization. 
 Note again that, in historical terms, voting ‘in bloc’ was not an institutionally-
induced behavior, but a party strategy- induced behavior.  In the old fashion way, certain 
men more or less distinguished for their professional or other activities were announced 
as eligible by newspapers or offered themselves as candidates.  Gradually, elected 
representatives turned to organize their supporters and present lists or tickets of 
candidates.  The success of this new way may lie in the fact that ‘party’ candidacies and 
labels provide the voters very cheap information about their candidates, which may be 
more difficult to obtain about those candidates who are not labeled, especially in mass 
elections and relatively complex electorates.  This may move voters to vote in bloc 
rather than for individuals weighed separately. 
However, party inducements to voting in bloc were also crucially helped in some 
countries and periods by the form of ballot, which is of course an institutional feature of 
elections.  In the earliest times above surveyed, oral voting or handwritten ballots 
facilitated to the voter the choice of individual candidates independently from their 
possible grouping or factional allegiance.  At some moment, which can be roughly 
located around the 1830s and 1840s for Britain, the United States and a few countries in 
Western Europe, the parties began to print their own ballots, listing only their own 
candidates.  The voter needed only to cast the paper in the ballot box without marking 
any candidate to vote for the entire list (the ‘general ticket’).  Typically the party ballots 
 20
were of various sizes, colors, and shapes, and thus distinguishable to the election 
officials, the candidates, the party organizers and the rest of voters.   
Still, splitting the vote between candidates from different parties was possible by 
crossing out and writing in names or by turning in multiple party ballots with votes 
marked on each.  In fact, in 19th century England, about half of districts with two seats 
rendered ‘split’ representation of two different groupings (Cox 1984).  But in the United 
States before 1890, a single party swept all the seats in almost 90 percent of elections in 
multi-member districts (Calabrese 2000).  Criticisms of party ballot were persistent.  In 
particular, the National Municipal League of the U. S., already mentioned above, 
defended non-partisan ballots in local government.  In the words of one of its founders, 
with party candidacies “a small, but well-disciplined, energetic and unscrupulous 
minority can generally defeat the honorable and patriotic majority”.  If people are forced 
to vote in bloc, “while many voters find sentiments which they disapprove in each 
platform, they can see no alternative but to cast the ir ballots for one or the other, and 
thus seem to endorse and support ideas to which they are really opposed” (Richardson 
1892, in Scarrow 2002).   
The so-called ‘Australian ballot’ made again non-partisan voting for individual 
candidates relatively easier.  The new ballot, which was now printed and distributed by 
the electoral authority, listed the candidates of all parties instead of only one.  As its 
name tells, this new form of ballot was first introduced in the British colonies in 
Australia since 1856, as well as in New Zealand in 1870; it was adopted in Britain in 
1872, Canada in 1874, Belgium in 1877, several states in the U.S. since 1888, and later 
in most other countries with democratic experience (Markoff 1999, Mackie 2000, 
Lehoucq 2003).   
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Under multi-member elections, the Australian ballot ensures secret vote if the 
procedure did include a booth where the voter could mark the ballot unobserved, but it 
also facilitates the choice of individual candidates independently from their party 
affiliation.  In some cases, the ballot requires the voters to vote for each candidate they 
wanted to vote for; but in others it is also possible to vote for all candidates from a party 
with a single mark, which still favors bloc voting.   
 
 
4. Against factions  
 
The emergence of factions and parties from within largely consensual elections and 
assemblies increased polarization, made representation more biased, and in general 
decreased voters’ satisfaction with political outcomes, as suggested by the formal model 
above discussed.  In communities holding elections with the ‘originating’ system during 
the 18th and 19th centuries, reactions against factions and political parties were loudly 
and widely voiced, as will be reviewed below.  Initially, factions tended to be loose and 
fluctuating groupings of individuals who joined together to support a particular leader 
or policy, but from the beginning they were viewed with suspicion as destroyers of 
previously existing unity and consensus.  Gradually, a tension was developing between 
the recurring suspicion of partisan divisions and the seeming inevitability of partisan 
organization.  Parties were eventually conceived as “unavoidable evils”. But, as 
summarized by Susan Scarrow in her survey of critical perspectives on political parties, 
“even many avowed democrats were not favorably disposed toward the evolving 
realities of organized parties … while political experience may have convinced many 
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people of parties’ inevitability and expediency, it was and is less effective in persuading 
everyone of their desirability” (Scarrow 2002: 4). 
A number of early, prominent analyses and statements along this line can be re-
interpreted in the light of the discussion presented in this article.  In general, in classical 
political literature 'faction' is usually associated to bad intentions, in the disadvantage of 
general or at least broad collective interests.  David Hume, in particular, early 
considered that "sects and factions [should] be detested and hated… [because they] 
subvert government, render law impotent, and beget the fiercest animosities" (Hume 
1741).  Later on, however, he pondered that "to abolish all distinctions of party may not 
be practicable, perhaps not desirable, in a free government".  Interestingly, when in the 
further period Hume had to face the undesirable but perhaps unavoidable existence of 
political parties, he turned to wish that government were in hands not of a single party 
but of multiple-party coalitions in order "to prevent all unreasonable insult and triumph 
of the one party over the other, to encourage moderate opinions, to find the proper 
medium in all disputes, to persuade each that its antagonist may possibly be sometimes 
in the right, and to keep a balance in the praise and blame, which we bestow on either 
side" (Hume 1758).  
Perhaps it was Jean-Jacques Rousseau who better realized and anticipated the 
dramatic influence of factions in elections held in multi-member districts by plurality 
rule –as used in his natal Geneva. "When factions arise –he observed in a rather well-
known but diversely interpreted passage--, and partial associations are formed at the 
expense of the great association, the will of each of these associations becomes general 
in relation to its members, while it remains particular in relation to the community: it 
may then be said that there are no longer as many votes as there are men, but only as 
many as there are associations… Lastly, when one of these associations is so great as to 
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prevail over all the rest, the result is no longer a sum of small differences, but a single 
difference; in this case there is no longer a general will, and the opinion which prevails 
is purely particular".  Highly remarkably, also Rousseau pondered that if factions of 
parties were unavoidable, that is, "if there are partial societies, it is best to have as many 
as possible and to prevent them from being unequal" (Rousseau 1762). 
A similar evolution can be detected in James Madison –actually influenced by 
reading Hume-- who initially also condemned factions, but later on saw them as 
unavoidable and even a necessary evil.  Madison perceptively noted that, with parties 
organized, in small communities there would likely be a single dominant party 
embedded in local prejudices and schemes of injustice --and "the smaller the number of 
individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are 
placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plan of oppression".  In 
contrast, greater political units would provide "the greater security afforded by a greater 
variety of parties, against the event of any one party being able to outnumber and 
oppress the rest... In an equal degree does the increased variety of parties comprised 
within the [large] Union increase this security" (Madison 1788, No. 10).  Madison 
surely had in mind previous experiences in the House of Delegates in Virginia, of which 
he had been a member, as other prominent leaders of the newly emerging United States, 
when they turned to organize new political parties at national level, took references in 
traditional factions and personalized cliques in local and state institutions holding 
elections with the ‘originating’ system. (Main 1973, Aldrich 1995). 
The present analysis induces us to revise also an established interpretation of 
some statements by Honoré Gabriel Riqueti, Count de Mirabeau, in his address to the 
provincial Estate of Provence in 1789, on the edge of the events that would trigger the 
Revolution in France.  It must be remarked that the subject under discussion on that 
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occasion was precisely the procedure to follow for the election of provincial 
representatives to the Estates-General.  Mirabeau and his audience certainly had in mind 
the multi-member district, individual vote type of elections they were used to participate 
in at local and provincial levels.  He famously declared that “the Estates-General are to 
the nation what a chart is to its physical configuration; in all its parts and as a whole the 
copy should at all times have the same proportions as the original”.  In another passage 
of the same speech, Mirabeau stated, “the nation is not there [in the Estates’ assemblies] 
if those who call themselves its representatives have not been chosen in free and 
individual elections, if the representatives of groups of equal importance are not equal 
numerically and in voting power… In order to know the will of the nation, the votes 
must be collected in such a way so as to prevent the mistake of taking the will of an 
estate for one other, or the particular will of certain individuals for the general will”. 
(Author’s translation, with emphases added, from Mirabeau 1789, vol. 1: 7-8).   
These statements have been often interpreted as an early pronouncement in favor 
of the principles of proportional representation (see, for example, Hoag and Hallett 
1926, McLean 1991, Colomer 2001).  However, we should acknowledge that no 
explicit reference to new electoral rules of proportional representation was ever made by 
Mirabeau and that the discussion about these principles as potentially operative for 
allocating seats on the basis of votes did not start until several decades later.  Putting 
Mirabeau’s contribution in context, it may appear rather obvious that he was referring to 
elections held in multi-member districts by an open ballot favoring the choice of 
individual candidates and majority rule.  He was alluding to the peril to impose only 
votes in bloc for each of the estates in a way that the aristocracy and the clergy would 
prevail over the whole nation.  But note that Mirabeau stated that the at the time really 
existing elected assemblies “are” like a chart of the nation, and that they “should” keep 
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being it.  If they actually “were” like a chart is because they were elected in a way 
permitting such a representation (in the two senses of the word); that they “should” 
maintain that characteristic may be reasonably interpreted as a warning against the risk 
that they might cease being it and become partial, most likely as a consequence of 
voting in bloc for closed lists of candidates of each estate, grouping or faction. 
The authors mentioned were among the most influential in constitution making 
and criticism in Britain, the emerging United States, revolutionary France, and 
indirectly in many other countries at the time.  It is noteworthy to remark that they 
essentially coincided in the following observations.   
* First, they valued positively traditional electoral systems based on multi-
member districts and individual-candidate voting --what I call here the ‘originating’ 
system-- able to produce a faithful representation of the community, like “a mirror”.   
* Second, they realized that the formation of electoral factions or parties 
introduced more biased and partial representation than previous practices based on 
individual votes for individual candidates.   
* Third, they eventually acknowledged that in mass elections in large societies, 
in which the homogeneity of interests and values which prevailed in small, simple 
communities during the previous eras was decreasing, the formation of political factions 
was unavoidable and perhaps even necessary to make the political representation of a 
diversity of groups possible.   
* Finally, they considered that once parties had began to intervene in the 
electoral process, the existence of multiple parties was better than the concentration of 
power in the hands of a single party, in the sense of re-establishing to some extent the 
previous capacity of elections to become “a mirror” of the society by giving 
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representation to different groups.  In other words, if parties were unavoidable, multi-
partism was better than single-party dominance or two-party alternation. 
 
 
5. Derived electoral systems  
 
To the extent that parties and factionalization were unavoidable, the re-establishment of 
broad electoral representation required the invention and introduction of new electoral 
rules different from the traditional, now obsolete system based on multi-member 
districts and majoritarian rules.  During the first few decades of the 20th century, as 
surveyed above, the ‘originating’ electoral system had generally been replaced with 
alternative formulas.  Multi-member elections with majoritarian rules basically survived 
at local level elections, although they also reappeared in a number of cases of new 
democracies without previous experience of competitive elections.  Virtually all the new 
electoral rules and procedures that were created since the 19th century can be understood 
as innovative variations of the ‘originating’ system –which can be called ‘originating’ 
precise for this.  They can be classified in three groups, depending on whether they 
changed the district magnitude, the ballot, or the rule.   
 The first group of new electoral rules implied a change of the district magnitude 
from multi-member to single-member districts, of course keeping both individual-
candidate voting and majoritarian rules.  With smaller single-member districts a 
candidate that would have been defeated by a party sweep in a multi-member district 
may be elected.  This system, thus, tends to produce more varied representation than 
multi-member districts with party closed lists, although less than multi-member districts 
with open ballot.  In late 18th century, single-member districts were broadly introduced 
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in Scotland and Wales and in lower proportions in England, although they did not 
become the general norm for all Britain until 1885.  In the U.S., single-member districts 
were introduced in the state of Vermont in 1793 and gradually expanded to the rest of 
the country, especially for the election of the House of Representatives since 1842, as 
mentioned.  Also France replaced multi-member districts with single-member districts 
for first time in 1820, but re-established both formulas back and forth during the rest of 
the 19th century. 
 The second group of new electoral rules implied new forms of ballot favoring 
individual-candidate voting despite the existence of party candidacies, while 
maintaining the other two essential elements of the traditional system: multi-member 
districts and majoritarian rules.  Two variants of limited vote (with either several votes 
or a single vote per voter) were already proposed during the French Revolutionary 
Convention of 1793 by Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat, Marquis de Condorcet, and 
Antoine-Louis-Leon de Saint-Just, on behalf of the Girondin and the Jacobin factions, 
respectively, as alternatives to the traditional system of multi-member districts with 
equal number of votes as seats, but they were never applied.  By limited vote, one party 
can sweep as many seats as votes the voter can vote for, but it is likely that the rest of 
seats will be won by candidates of different political affiliation.  The earliest 
experiences of limited vote in multi-member districts took place in Spain, first in the 
form of single-nontransferable vote, that is, with only one vote per voter, from 1865 on, 
and giving each voter two votes in three-seat districts from 1878 on.  Limited vote was 
also early introduced in previously existing multi-member districts in Britain in 1868 
and in Brazil in 1875.  A different but related formula, the cumulative ballot, which 
permits the voter to give more than one vote to the same candidate, was also introduced 
in previously existing multi-member districts, first of all in the state of Illinois in 1869 
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and later in some Latin European and Latin American countries, as well as in a number 
of U.S. local elections. 
Finally, the third group of new electoral rules implied the introduction of 
proportional representation (PR) formulas, which permit to maintain multi-member 
districts and in some variants also open or individual-candidate ballot.  The first 
proposals for distributing seats among different parties in proportion to their votes were 
formulated, on the basis of a fixed amount or quota of votes worth a seat, by French 
mathematician Joseph-Diaz Gergonne in 1820, just when the old system based on multi-
member districts was substantially revised in France for first time, and by Philadelphia's 
activist Thomas Gilpin in 1844, together with strong criticism of the uses of party lists 
in traditional multi-member districts.  (Gergonne 1829, Gilpin 1844). 
As is better known, another early formula usually considered to belong to the 
group of proportional representation rules is the single-transferable vote (STV), which 
was successively proposed by English school-teacher Thomas W. Hill in 1821, Danish 
politician Carl-Christopher-Georg Andrae in 1855, and English lawyer Thomas Hare 
from 1857 on.  As the traditional ‘originating’ system, STV is used in multi-member 
districts with individual voting, although it requires each voter not only to select but to 
rank candidates.  Another formula of proportional representation was presented by 
Belgian civil law professor Victor d'Hondt in 1878 and was initially adopted in Belgium 
in 1899.  This and other PR formulas require, of course, multi-member districts and are 
also compatible with the another essential element of the ‘originating’ system: 
individual-candidate voting, as in open double vote, preferential voting and open ballot, 
the latter used in Switzerland since 1918. 
 
Conclusion 
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In traditional analyses in political science, political parties have been presented as 
derived from previously existing assemblies, elections and electoral systems, rather than 
the other way round.  The present article has documented this relationship, but it only 
appears to be valid in general terms for remote periods in which a very old electoral 
system based on multi-member districts, open ballot, and a majoritarian rule was used.  
This electoral system, while being able to produce a pluralistic representation, it did 
indeed create incentives for the formation of coordinated candidacies and voting 
coalitions, usually called ‘factions’, which were the most primitive form of political 
parties.  However, once partisan candidacies, partisan voting in bloc and even partisan 
ballots emerged, political leaders, activists and politically motivated scholars began to 
search for alternative electoral systems able to reduce single-party sweeps and 
exclusionary vic tories.  This new period started developing well advanced the 19th 
century.  It can be hold that , from that moment on, it was the previously existing 
political parties that chose, manipulated and promoted the invention of new electoral 
rules, including the Australian ballot, single-member districts, limited and cumulative 
ballots, and proportional representation rules, rather than the other way round.  This 
trend in favor of more pluralistic electoral rules was in some sense a re-establishment of 
the varied, “like a mirror” representation of the community which had been 
characteristic of the multi-member district-based set of rules that I have suggested to 
call the ‘originating’ electoral system. 
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Table 1.  Individual-candidate voting and party voting 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Distribution of preferences   Results with different candidacies 
      Individuals     Party WX     WX vs. YZ 
Table 1.1.  Consensual society 
Voters’ groups: A     B     C     D 
No. of voters:  10   40    30    10        
------------------------------------------------  
First preference W    X    Y Z W: 10, X: 80 W: 50, X: 60 W: 50, X: 50  
Second preference X     Y     X Y Y: 80, Z: 10 Y: 40, Z: 30 Y: 40, Z: 40 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 1.2.  Polarized society 
Voters’ groups: A     B     C     D 
No. of voters:  40    10    10 30      
------------------------------------------------    
First preference W     X     Y Z W: 40, X: 60 W: 50, X: 60 W: 50, X: 50 
Second preference X      Y     X Y Y: 50, Z: 30 Y: 40, Z: 30 Y: 40, Z: 40 
 
Note:  This is a model of an election in a two-member district, with two votes per voter 
(M = V = 2), and plurality rule.  The results in the second column with individual-
candidate voting derive from the assumption that each group of voters vote for their two 
preferred individual candidates; in the third column, with party WX, voters vote ‘in 
bloc’ for W and X if they prefer any of the two as first preference; in the fourth column, 
with two parties WX and YZ, all voters vote ‘in bloc’ for the party including their first 
preference.  The winners are underlined. 
 
 
 
 
